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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine the relationship between economic and electoral outcomes in Canada 
since Confederation (1867) and the role that economic policy has played in influencing this 
relationship.  The results are consistent with voter concern for the overall performance of the 
economy in the incumbent’s governing term—the average growth rate of per capita GDP and 
average unemployment rate—while rejecting the presence of a political business/budget cycle 
response in the period leading into an upcoming election. Evidence for the effect of performance 
on the stability of the political party system (as measured by party vote volatility) is even stronger. 
The data also are consistent with the use of policy for countercyclical stability (primarily through 
spending and deficits), fiscal response to voter turnout, the growth of both spending and deficits 
under larger governing majorities and compliant monetary response to fiscal deficits. 
 
Key words: economic and electoral outcomes, political business cycle, political influences on 
policy, policy endogeneity, seemingly unrelated regressions    
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In this paper we examine the relationships arising between economic and electoral 
outcomes in Canada and the role that economic policy has played in influencing these 
relationships.  While much has been written on this topic generally, recent concern with their 
interconnections has focused on the role of economic, political and policy volatility and hence 
have opened an opportunity to re-examine the multiple forms of their interdependence in 
Canada.1  Application to Canada is particularly meaningful because of the long history of stability 
in its underlying political and legal institutions (since Confederation in 1867).  This has allowed 
critical focus on such issues as the incumbent’s likelihood of re-election, the length of the 
governing term and the stability of the political party structure without having to account for the 
viability of the economic and political systems as a whole.  However, an important complication 
arises in Westminster democracies such as Canada’s from the conventional ability of the 
governing party (through the Prime Minister) to control the timing of upcoming elections.2 This 
flexibility in election timing has made problematic the strategic role of economic policy: pitting 
the hypothesis that election dates are chosen (surfed) by the incumbent governing party in 
response to economic circumstance (Smith, 2003; Kayser, 2005; Ferris and Voia, 2009) against 
the hypothesis that government policy will be used by the incumbent political party to induce a 
more favourable electoral outcome (Rogoff and Silbert, 1988; Ferris and Voia, 2011).  While the 
two hypotheses do not stand in direct opposition, the adoption of either strategy undermines 
the electoral effectiveness of the other. To isolate policy opportunism in the set of choices 
defining economic policy, election opportunism must be distinguished from the more general 
political necessity of providing ‘good government’.  This we interpret as using policy to stabilize 
 
1 Recent papers linking economic outcomes, policy and political volatility include Brunetti, 1997, 1998; Ali, 2001; 
Henisz, 2004; Mobarak, 2005; Nooruddin and Chhibber, 2008; Jong-A-Pin, 2009; Klomp and de Haan, 2009; 
Edwards and Thames, 2010; Bejar and Mukherjee, 2011; Fatas and Mihov, 2013; Aisen and Veiga, 2013; Ashworth, 
et al., 2014; and Bizarro, et.al. 2018. For Canadian specific studies, see Nadeau and Blais, 1993; Reid, 1998; Serletis 
and Afxentiou, 1998; Johnston, 1999; Nadeau, Blais, Nevitte, and Gidengil, 2000; Kneebone and MacKenzie, 2001; 
Ferris and Voia, 2011 and Voia and Ferris (2013). 
2 Note that many Westminster parliamentary democracies, including Canada’s, have recently adopted “fixed” 
election terms. These include South Africa (1996), New Zealand (1993), Scotland (1998), Ireland (1992) and the 
United Kingdom (2011). In Canada’s case, the 2015 election was the first federal election held under the fixed 
timing rule set legislatively by the Conservative Party in 2008. The conflict posed by the presence of both a 
confidence requirement and a fixed four-year governing term makes the reliability of fixed election terms 
problematic (for majority governments).  Unlike United Kingdom legislation, for example, there is in Canada no 
minimum vote requirement established before an election can be called. On the adoption of fixed election terms 
in Canada, see Ferris and Olmstead (2017).   
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the economy from fluctuations in the business cycle, to provide for the allocative and 
redistributive demands of an ever-changing voting public and to respond to the partisan nature 
of the party in power and significant particular circumstances (such as world wars and periods of 
minority government).   
 Our analysis begins by asking whether for Canada there is evidence that election 
outcomes for the incumbent governing party—the likelihood that the incumbent will win the 
upcoming election and/or raise its vote share—are related in predictable ways to better 
economic performance during its governing tenure? The economic outcomes we consider 
include the levels and variability of the growth rates of real per capita income, unemployment 
and the rate of inflation.3 In short, is there evidence of a political business cycle?  Broadening the 
focus beyond the electoral prospects of just the governing party, we also ask whether the 
structure of Canada’s party system responds to economic performance.  Here the stability of 
party structure is measured by the volatility of vote shares among Canada’s political parties.   
An initial look at the data finds evidence of a pro-cyclical election cycle in economic 
growth rates and a countercyclical cycle in unemployment rates and an even stronger response 
to both in vote volatility.  However, while these findings imply that economic circumstances do 
matter, the results do not preclude the possibility that these economic circumstances were 
produced by government policy (there is an underlying political budget cycle).  Hence to assess 
whether the correlations found between election and economic outcomes could have arisen 
from the policies adopted by the incumbent governments, we proceed in two stages.  First, we 
examine whether there is evidence of a direct relationship arising between election outcomes 
and government policy--the underlying levels or variability of the fiscal and monetary policies 
adopted during the incumbent government’s tenure (controlling for other non-policy 
characteristics of the political environment).  In the case of direct effects, the analysis is framed 
in relation to 39 of the 42 federal elections that have followed the adoption of Canada’s 
Westminster parliamentary structure in 1867.4    
 
3 Through our paper the variability of a variable is measured as a moving coefficient of variation (cv) —a 4-year 
lagged standard error divided by its 4-year mean.  In relation to elections the cv is an average of the yearly cv’s 
over the previous governing term.    
4  Because we have consistent annual economic data only from 1870 onwards, the use of growth rates and the use 
of 4 lags in the construction of moving averages and coefficients of variation results in our election coverage 
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 The inability to find a direct link to election outcomes from policy consistent with 
opportunism leads us to search for evidence of an indirect link through income changes produced 
by public policy for electoral purposes.  Here we use the longer annual time series on policy 
choices to ask what dimensions of government policy, if any, have been responsive to the timing 
of an election while controlling for other characteristics of the economic and political 
environment believed to have an influence on government policy.  That is, policy changes 
directed strategically at elections must be separated in the data from changes directed by the 
evolving demands of a voting public and good governance concerns that include the use of policy 
to counter the business cycle. Recognition of Wagner’s Law and counter-cyclical policy use raises 
a significant identification problem since policies and economic outcomes will be partially co-
determined. To control for endogeneity, we first use two stage least squares to instrument 
income within each policy equation and then adopt seemingly unrelated methods to incorporate 
potential interactions arising among policy instruments while controlling for endogeneity. 
Controlling for competing uses of policy and their interaction may then serve to isolate time 
periods in which policies respond in ways consistent with producing the income and 
unemployment rate movements that have produced election cycles.  
 The paper concludes by summarizing our findings. In arguing that policy use in Canada 
has been directed primarily at providing good governance, we add the cautionary note that our 
results are specific to the operation of pluralistic Westminster democracy in Canada before the 
adoption of fixed four-year governing terms (implemented in the 42nd election in 2015).  
Sufficient evidence exists on other Westminster democracies (India, Australia, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom) to suggest that the commonality of some aspects of institutional form need 
not imply the commonality of operation in practice.  
 
1. Incumbent electoral outcomes, party structure stability and economic performance  
 
beginning in the third election in 1875. This leaves us with data on 39 elections. When using unemployment, the 
number falls to 29 and with its coefficient of variation it falls to 27.  Turning to policy, the 1932 incorporation of the 
Bank of Canada restricts our inclusion of monetary policy to the 25 elections following 1935.  The recent October 
21 2019 election is not covered. 
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Our analysis begins by examining the effects produced on two election outcome margins 
by economic performance: the extensive margin describing the contribution of economic 
conditions to the likelihood that the incumbent governing party will win the upcoming election 
and two forms of the intensive margin--one describing the contribution of the economy’s 
economic performance to the vote share received by the incumbent party and the second 
examining their effects on the electoral stability of the political party system (as measured by 
party vote volatility).   In general terms, the extensive margin can be modelled as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟 = 1| 𝑋) + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 (𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐)   (1) 
where the set of conditioning variables X includes three measures of economic performance (the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita, the rate of inflation and the unemployment rate) and where 
each performance measure appears both as a level and as its volatility.  The performance 
measures appear in levels either as a lagged outcome (typically the value in the year prior to an 
election) or as an average arising over an election window (either the four years leading into each 
election or the time interval that the incumbent party governed). The volatility of each level is 
measured by its coefficient of variation, the standard deviation normalized by its mean.5  
 While good versus bad times may signal whether the incumbent will win or lose an 
election, changes in the incumbent’s vote share and/or changes in vote volatility may offer a 
more subtle view of the effects of economic performance on the political process. That is, the 
approval or disapproval of voters may be better captured by the change in the vote share going 
to the incumbent party rather than simply by whether the incumbent party wins or loses.  
Similarly, voters’ reaction to economic circumstance may be more fully captured by the degree 
of vote shifting that arises among all active political parties.  In a country like Canada where 
multiple parties appeal to different voting groups and offer competing policy programs, vote 
 
5 In constructing the dimensionality of the economic and policy variables to associate with election outcomes we 
experimented with different window lengths (from 1 to 4 years) and with the positioning of those time periods 
relative to the election. The text presents the most informative of these possibilities for per capita income, a four-
year average with standard errors based on the current and three lagged values of the outcome variable. In terms 
of an expectation hypothesis, the measure implies that voters incorporate some degree of foresight along with 
past information in forming their expectation of future performance. For most other averages and coefficients of 
variation, the average was based on the time interval that the incumbent party was in office and the coefficient 
based on a four-year moving average. 
5 
 
switching among political parties may be a more meaningful indicator of voter unrest and political 
instability.6 To capture these possibilities we model the two intensive margins as: 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 | 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑋) + 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟   (2) 
where the set X of outcome measures is defined as in (1).   
Because the growth rate of per capita GDP is expected to register strongly in our results, 
we have divided each table below into two parts to test whether the pre-election growth rate or 
the average level of income/output term performance matters more to voters. To do so the first 
four columns in each table present the results using the per capita growth rate arising in the year 
immediately prior to the upcoming election and the final four columns use instead the average 
per capita growth rate arising over the four years leading into the upcoming election.7  The tables 
are also subdivided by the fact that the unemployment rate in Canada is available only from 1919 
onwards.  For this reason, we use the odd numbered columns in each table to represent the 
results for the longer time period covering the 3th through the 42nd elections while the even 
numbered columns present the results when the unemployment rate and its coefficient added 
covering the truncated period from the 15th to the 42nd election.8 Data sources for the variables 
used in the following empirical work are included in a data appendix at the end of the paper. 
 In Table 1 then we examine the electoral prospects facing the incumbent governing party.  
The likelihood of winning is modelled as in equation (1) and the model explaining incumbent vote 
shares is described in equation (2).  Scanning Table 1, two features immediately stand out. First, 
the use of the average term per capita GDP growth rate (in the second half of the table) 
dominates in significance the use of the per capita GDP growth in the period leading into the 
upcoming election (in the first half of the table).  While only one of the four coefficients of the 
prior year per capita growth rate is significant (and this using only a 10 percent confidence 
interval), fully three of the four average growth rate coefficients are significant at either the 5 or 
 
6 In Canada a rising level of support for regional parties and/or national parties with different levels of regional 
representation is often a strong indicator of political unrest over the existing structure of federalism. 
7 In dating the incidence of pre-election per capita growth, we also experimented with using the actual year of the 
election and a year split in July.  The year prior to the election was the most informative of the three alternatives.  
8 The coefficient of variation in the unemployment rate is included for completeness but is never found to be 
significant.  Excluding it increases the significance of both the average per capita growth rate, the average 
unemployment rate, and particularly for the inflation volatility measure. Results available on request. 
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1 percent level.  This difference in significance between the two growth measures is repeated, as 
we will see, for vote volatility in Table 2.  The second observation is that the set of economic 
outcome variables explain at most between 20 and 40 percent of the variation in incumbent 
electoral outcomes.  Hence to the extent that the correlations capture causation, aggregate 
economic performance can explain only part of election outcomes.9  With this qualification in 
mind, however, the data are consistent with at least two of the economic performance variables 
having a significant effect on the incumbent’s election results.   
-- insert Table 1 about here -- 
As noted earlier, a higher average per capita growth rate over the four-year interval 
leading into the current election significantly signals both a higher likelihood of the incumbent 
party winning the upcoming election and receiving a higher share of the vote.10  For Canada, then, 
the data is consistent with the hypothesis that higher income growth rates matter to voters, more 
so than simply the growth rate arising in the year leading into the election.  In this sense the data 
rejects the hypothesis of a political business cycle relative to the hypothesis that voters care more 
for the overall performance under the governing political party and are neither fooled by nor 
responsive to the signal of a rising per capita growth rate in the period immediately before the 
upcoming election.11   
The second performance measure that appears to matter for electoral success is the 
average unemployment rate arising during the incumbent party’s tenure.  In this case, however, 
although all prior unemployment coefficients exhibit the predicted negative effect on electoral 
success, significance arises only in the first set of regression results when used in combination 
with the prior income growth rate.12 Reading the unemployment effect together with the growth 
 
9 It is important to note that while we focus only on aggregate measures of performance and policy, policy can also 
play a significant distributional role in impacting election results.  See for example, Blanchard, Brown and Chor 
(2019) who examine the role of Trump tariffs with respect to 2018 U.S. election outcomes.   
10 The average per capita growth coefficient is significantly different from zero using a 14 percent confidence 
interval when the unemployment rate is included. 
11 Note that while growth rates are often used to explain the likelihood of incumbent electoral success in the 
political literature (Fair, 1978; Hibbs, 2012), it not a factor found generally in tests for the political business cycle in 
developed democracies (see Brender and Drazen, 2008).  Here both results can be found depending upon the 
length and incidence of the time interval used in the growth rate. 
12 It may be worth noting that when the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rate is dropped from the 
regressions, the prior unemployment rate often becomes significant.  
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rate effect across the eight columns, it appears that incumbent electoral success is associated 
with either a higher per capita growth rate or a lower unemployment rate but not both at the 
same time.13    
For the incumbent party, then, the average per capita growth rate realized over the 
governing term and/or the prior term unemployment rate are the only ones of the six dimensions 
of economic performance that are consistent in affecting incumbent political party success.  
Aside from these, columns (6) and (7) present the only other instances of statistical significance.  
In both of these cases the volatility of the income growth rate is found to be positively related to 
the incumbent’s winning vote share, a directional effect that is inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that greater volatility would be perceived as an electoral bad.  Looking even more generally at 
the electoral effects associated with economic volatility, the data offer very little support for the 
hypothesis that the volatilities of output growth, inflation or unemployment matter much for the 
electoral success of the incumbent governing party.  Only three of the twelve coefficients of 
variations are significant and these become significant only at the 10 percent level and with 
coefficient signs inconsistent with the hypothesis that lower volatility will improve the electoral 
prospects of the incumbent party.   
 In Table 2 we use the linearized form of equation (2) to test for the effects of economic 
outcome on electoral party stability as measured by two vote volatilities (see Przeworski and 
Sprague (1971), Pedersen (1979)): a consistency-based measure of candidacy vote volatility and 
a party-based volatility measure developed at the national level.14 The former registers the 
average amount of vote switching among candidates at the constituency level while the latter 
measures vote switching among parties at the national level. Given that better economic 
outcomes promote greater political stability, per capita GDP growth is expected to be inversely 
related to vote volatility while inflation and unemployment rates are expected to be positively 
related to vote shifting across parties. Because ex post variability implies ex ante uncertainty, all 
forms of performance variability are expected to increase voter unhappiness with the political 
status quo serving to promote greater vote shifting among competing parties. The results in Table 
 
13 The average per capita growth rate and unemployment rates over the shorter 1921 to 2012 time period are 
inversely correlated (𝜌 =-.317). 
14 For the special circumstances used to construct these indices for Canada, see Ferris, Winer and Grofman (2016). 
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2 then offer a different and perhaps more subtle view of the effects of economic performance 
on the stability of the political process.   
-- insert Table 2 about here – 
 When Tables 1 and 2 are compared it becomes apparent that the link between economic 
and electoral outcomes is much stronger for vote switching than for the vote swing to or from 
the incumbent party.15 This suggests that the economic performance of the economy has a much 
deeper effect on forms of political stability than simply indicating the future electoral prospects 
of the incumbent party.  Inspection of Table 2 also reveals that the average level of per capita 
growth (in columns (5) through (8)) is again more informative than the annual growth rate in the 
year leading into the election in explaining the evolution of vote volatility over time.  This 
reinforces the Table 1 finding that the incumbent party’s electoral prospects are more responsive 
to the average performance of the economy over the previous governing period than the 
performance arising in the year prior to the upcoming election.  Together these imply that overall 
performance matters much more than last minute results. 
Focusing then on the ‘average’ results of columns (5) through (8), all three performance 
criteria (growth, inflation and unemployment) can be seen to impact party structure in the 
expected way.  The average growth rate is negatively related to vote volatility and significantly 
so in two of the four cases. This is consistent with rising incomes validating voters’ choices, not 
only with the incumbent party (as in Table 1) but with their overall set of political choices. 
Interestingly, greater volatility in the per capita growth rate does not appear to prompt a 
reassessment by voters of incumbent party loyalty, reinforcing the effect produced by its level.  
With respect to the other economic outcomes, better economic performances by way of lower 
unemployment rates and lower inflation rate volatility are consistently found to be associated 
with greater stability in political party structure and often significantly so (with 8 of 12 coefficient 
estimates significantly different from zero).  Of the two remaining performance measures only 
unemployment variability is found to be consistently insignificant while the average inflation rate 
 
15 Dash and Ferris (2018) find similar effects with respect to Indian States. 
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alternates in sign and has only one coefficient estimate consistent with higher inflation rates 
increasing vote switching among new and existing political parties.16 
While the variability measures of economic performance were found in Table 1 to have 
had no effect on the electoral prospects of the incumbent political party, the variability and hence 
unpredictability of economic outcomes does matter significantly for the stability of political party 
structure. The coefficients of variation of both per capita growth and inflation are significantly 
related to both forms of vote volatility but affect vote switching in opposing ways. Particularly 
interesting is the result found for inflation where the data is consistent with the hypothesis that 
voters recognize the long-held monetarist position that the economic damage arising from 
inflation arises not from its level but from the coordination issues created by its variability.  This 
is reflected in the differing significance of the two inflation coefficients.  The coefficient of 
variation of inflation indicates a significant positive relationship with vote volatility while the level 
of the inflation rate shows no relationship with volatility across types or time periods.  Greater 
variation in the growth rate, on the other hand works in the opposite direction and provides the 
only result that contradicts prior expectation.   
 The results in Tables 1 and 2 are then consistent with the hypothesis that Canadian federal 
election results do respond to overall economic circumstances while tending to reject the 
presence of election opportunism as expected by political business cycle theory. However, 
because economic outcomes are not exogenous, it could be the case that these average 
performance outcomes are enhanced by economic policies adopted strategically by the 
incumbent governing party.  That is, the election outcomes in Tables 1 and 2 may reflect the 
response to economic conditions produced by the strategic use of fiscal and/or monetary policy.  
To look for this, however, the changes in economic policy arising for strategic election purposes 
need to be distinguished from changes arising for other political purposes, such as those arising 
from circumstances associated with minority governments or from policy platforms 
characteristic of the partisan nature of the governing political party.  Before we turn to analyze 
the extent to which different policy objectives may be reflected in economic policy, we first ask 
 
16 Dropping the coefficient of variation of the unemployment rate from the regressions increases the significance 
of the remaining performance variables. Results available on request. 
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whether the data is consistent with aggregate measures of economic policy having their own 
direct, independent effect on electoral outcomes.  Is there a political budget cycle in Canada?   
 
2. Election outcomes and their direct relationship to fiscal and monetary policy 
To assess whether there is a direct link between electoral outcomes in Canada and the 
fiscal and/or monetary policies chosen by the incumbent government, we regress our set of 
electoral outcomes against two dimensions of fiscal policy (the growth rates of government 
spending and revenues relative to GDP) and one dimension of monetary policy (the rate of 
growth of the money base).  The latter becomes feasible only following the creation of the Bank 
of Canada in 1932.  In considering the effects of these policy instruments, we test for the effects 
of the levels of these policies and their variability (through their coefficients of variation) while 
controlling for a set of other political characteristics that sometimes argued to have their own 
independent effect on electoral outcomes.  These include: the scale of voter turnout (Hansford 
and Gomez, 2010; Persson, Solevid and Ohrvall, 2013), changes in the size of the voting franchise 
(Metzer and Richards, 1981; Husted and Kenny, 1997), the partisan nature of the incumbent 
political party (Hibbs, 1977; liberal = 1; conservative = 0), whether the previous government was 
a minority government and the length of the previous governing term (Bischoff, 2013). The 
results are presented in Table 3, where each of our election outcome variables is regressed over 
two time intervals: the longer period of 39 elections covering both dimensions of fiscal policy and 
their coefficients of variation; and a shorter period of 23 elections that allows the incorporation 
of monetary policy (measured as the rate of growth of the money base) and its coefficient of 
variation. 
-- insert Table 3 about here -- 
The story told by Table 3 is relatively straightforward--there is very little evidence that 
policy has had any direct opportunistic effect on electoral outcomes.  In relation to the re-election 
prospects of the incumbent governing party, only one of the three policy variables produced 
substantive evidence of direct government policy influence. This is the case of government 
spending in the 1935-2015 time period where its growth rate is found to be significantly related 
to both the likelihood of incumbent re-election and the incumbent’s vote share, but inversely so.  
11 
 
Aside from the symmetric positive association of revenue growth with the likelihood of 
incumbent re-election, all other tax cases and all four monetary policy levels are found to have 
had no effect on the incumbent’s electoral prospects.  There is then evidence that fiscal policies 
have had an effect on election outcomes, but not in the direction posited by business cycle 
theory. To stimulate the economy in the period leading into an election, the correlations between 
spending and taxation on the one hand and election outcomes on the other would need to be 
opposite in sign to those found in the data. 
When we turn to look at the effects of fiscal and monetary policy levels on political party 
structure in columns (5) through (8), we see that there is even less evidence of a political budget 
cycle. None of the twelve coefficient estimates representing the effects of the three policy levels 
on the two volatility measures over the two time periods are found to be significantly different 
from zero. The policy programs adopted by the governing party have then had no measurable 
effect on the degree of vote shifting arising among political parties. 
The results with respect to the variability or unpredictability of government policies are 
only a little better.  Of the 20 different regression coefficients representing the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policy uncertainty on incumbent electoral success and political party 
structure, only 2 are significantly different from zero.  In the first case, in column (2), greater 
variability in fiscal spending is found to decrease the likelihood of incumbent re-election and thus 
is consistent with being considered as an electoral bad. In the second case, in column (8), greater 
monetary uncertainty is associated with greater instability in the political party structure.  
Combined with the inflation variability finding from Table 2, there is then evidence of a direct link 
between monetary policy and political instability through monetary instability.17 
Before leaving Table 3, it is of interest to note that of the covariates used to control for 
political influences on electoral outcomes, only two are found to be significant.  The first is that 
being the governing party in a minority government is associated with a greater likelihood of 
 
17 Note that the significant effect of monetary uncertainty on election outcomes arises through vote volatility 
rather than the electoral prospects of the incumbent political party. On the role of monetary policy in relation to 
the political business cycle in Canada, see Ferris (2008). 
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being re-elected.18 The second is that the length of the incumbent party’s governing tenure is 
positively associated with vote volatility in Canada.  That is, even when controlling for periods of 
minority government (that are highly unstable with short governing tenures), longer governing 
terms are found to be associated with greater instability in the political party structure as 
evidenced by greater vote switching and higher vote volatility.19  This is opposite to the result 
found in Bischoff (2013). 
 
3. Political and Economic Influences on Policy  
From Tables 1 and 2 we have seen that favourable electoral outcomes for incumbents 
and political party stability are positively related to economic growth and negatively related to 
inflation variability.  From Table 3 we have also seen that there is no direct link between 
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and these favourable outcomes.  However, although 
there is little evidence of a political business cycle in the sense of policy being used expansively 
in the time period immediately prior to an election, we have also found that fiscal policy and 
monetary policy volatility are related to election outcomes but in ways that differ from those 
implied by political business cycle theory. To look more closely at the political influences on 
government policy we turn to the greater detail available in annual rather than election-based 
data and use the larger number of observations available to deal analytically with the 
endogeneity of policy and outcome left to one side in earlier sections.  The changed perspective 
onto policy choices allows closer examination of the extent to which fiscal and monetary policy 
have been influenced by four types of political concerns: a response to the changing demands of 
the voting public for publicly provided goods and services, the need to provide good government 
by facilitating growth and stabilizing the economy about the business cycle, using policy 
strategically both with respect to the upcoming election and with providing partisan benefits as 
constrained by the degree of political competition faced in the legislature.  With more 
 
18 In Canada, minority governments often form the first stage of a transition from one party to another. Examples 
include the Diefenbaker minority government defeat of the Liberal Party in 1957 followed by the large Diefenbaker 
victory in 1958 and the two Harper minority governments in 2006 and 2008 leading to followed by victory in 2011. 
19 This result is consistent with the surfing hypothesis of election timing.  Choosing to last the entire term is to 
choose not to go earlier under more favourable conditions.  This increases the likelihood that economic outcomes 
over the term were not favourable.  
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observations and controls for other political characteristics of the political environment we may 
better isolate the degree to which policy has (or has not) been used strategically by the 
incumbent political party. 
We begin by noting that government policy and economic outcomes are at least partially 
co-determined. That is, not only do we expect that fiscal and/or monetary policy will respond to 
economic circumstance, but do so because we expect that policy can and will affect per capita 
income/output.  Hence to measure the response of policy to performance outcomes we need to 
include in per capita income growth only that portion of output growth that would have been 
produced by underlying increases in Canada’s factors of production and productivity.  That is, we 
must instrument the per capita growth rate with variables correlated with per capita growth but 
not with other cyclical, strategic or other political uses of policy. Because of Canada’s close 
industrial integration with the U.S. economy (three quarters of all Canadian exports go to the 
U.S.), Canadian per capita output growth (PC_growth) has become highly correlated with the 
growth rate of the U.S Index of Industrial Production (𝜌 = .698) without there being a strong 
possibility that Canada’s economic performance or the growth rate of Canada’s federal 
government size has significantly influenced aggregate U.S. incomes or output.  This makes the 
growth rate of the US Index of industrial production, USiip_growth--an instrument that is highly 
correlated with per capita GDP growth and itself unrelated to the factors determining Canada’s 
fiscal and monetary policy—a good instrument.  A regression of USiip_growth on PC_growth to 
generate a predicted value of real GDP per capita absent policy is highly significant, explaining 35 
percent of the variation in the growth rate of per capita output over our time period.20    
-- Table 4 about here – 
 The changes observed in the data measuring the growth rates government spending, 
taxes and the change in the size of the government’s deficit (together with monetary policy) 
represent the net response of the current government to the multiple claims on its policy use. 
Hence these measures of policy represent governing party’s net response to changes in the scale 
and composition of the voting public, changes in the political characteristics of the parties 
 
20 More explicitly,  PC_growth = .006* (.004) + .003*** (.0003) USiip_growth    R2 = .355  DW = 2.08 
where the standard errors are in brackets following the coefficient estimates. * (***) significant at 10 (1) percent. 
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(partisan type) and the type of government elected (majority versus minority government), 
changes reflecting response to variations in the business cycle, responses to serious exogenous 
events (such as world wars), and strategic actions with respect to elections and constraints arising 
from competing opposition parties.  To control for endogeneity while capturing these different 
dimensions of policy, we use a series of two stage least squares regressions to test a model of 
government policy choice taking the general form: 
𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦
=  𝑓(𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑐𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒, 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑝ℎ𝑖𝑐 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠  𝑜𝑓 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒, 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑛 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠, 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑙𝑑 𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑠 
 𝑑𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒, 𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑐 𝑏𝑒ℎ𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑟)          (3) 
where PC_growth, used represent the business cycle21, is instrumented by USiip_growth and the 
five policy measures that could have influenced economic performance (as indicated in Tables 1 
and 2) are: the growth rate of government expenditure as a fraction of GDP, the  growth rate of 
government revenue as a fraction of GDP, the growth rate of the government’s deficit (defined 
as D[ln(G/Y) – ln(T/Y)], the growth rate of the money base (MB) and its moving four-year-based 
coefficient of variation (as a determinant of inflation variability). The variables used to proxy the 
conceptual determinants of policy are listed in Table 4 together with their time series properties.  
Concern with the latter is necessary to avoid spurious correlations arising from the mixed use of 
stationary and nonstationary variables. 
-- insert Table 4 about here -- 
The results of the two stage least squares models of economic policy choice are presented 
in Table 5.  The results indicate that a linearized version of the model of policy choice outlined in 
(3) explains roughly 25 percent of the variation in two measures of fiscal policy and over 60 
percent of the variation in monetary policy (and 35 percent of its variability). To the extent that 
the chosen variables represent different aspects of how political factors have influenced policy, 
the results suggest that politics has more influence on the expenditure side of fiscal policy than 
 
21 The growth rate of real GDP per capita, PC_growth is stationary about a mean of 1.92% over our time period.   
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on the revenue side and on the variability of monetary policy (more than its level).  The statistics 
on the under and over-identification tests appearing in the bottom row of Table 5 are consistent 
with the instrumenting of real GDP per capita with USiip_growth dealing adequately with the 
endogeneity arising between the policy measures and PC_growth.22  
Looking across the top row of the table for policy reaction to instrumented per capita 
growth, the data indicate that fiscal policy is consistently and significantly countercyclical, with 
spending increasing upwards in response to a downturn in the economy more than does revenue, 
producing countercyclical fiscal deficits that stimulate the economy.  The data also suggest that 
the two dimensions of monetary policy are somewhat procyclical, but neither the coefficient on 
the money base growth rate nor its coefficient of variation are significantly different from zero. 
In terms of more specific political connections to fiscal policy, the data indicate that higher voter 
turnout is associated with a lower rate of growth in government spending and smaller sized 
deficits, while a fall (rise) in the proportion of the population that is young (old) is associated with 
an increase in the growth rate of government spending and larger sized deficits.  The data also 
suggest that periods of minority government and periods when the more liberal party (the Liberal 
Party of Canada) are in power are associated with spending growth, decreases in the growth rate 
of taxes and rising deficits, but none of these relationships are significantly different from zero 
using conventional significance criteria. Periods of minority government are, however, associated 
significantly with greater monetary policy variability. 
While the data indicate that money growth becomes more expansive as the franchise 
grows in size, monetary policy in the sense of the rate of growth of the money base has been 
relatively free of other political influences that have influenced fiscal policy, tending to support 
the claim of central bank independence often made with respect to the Bank of Canada.  Where 
monetary policy is not independent of ‘outside influence’ is in response to fiscal deficits.  The 
data imply that fiscal deficits have been at least partially financed by changes in high powered 
money, with the same type of response appearing with respect to the financing of the 
 
22 The Kleibergen-Paap under-identification test statistic in all cases allows rejection of the hypothesis that the 
instruments under-identify per capita real GDP.  Similarly for all but the growth rate of government revenue, the 
Hanson J test statistics do reject the hypothesis that the chosen instruments can identify per capita GDP as 
independent of the error process. 
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extraordinary expenditures required by WW2.23 Perhaps surprisingly, the data also suggest that 
when the money growth rate rises with higher deficits, its predictability, as implied by the inverse 
movement of its coefficient of variation, increases rather than decreases.  
-- Table 5 about here -- 
 Finally, the degree of competition faced by the governing party in the legislature has 
mattered for fiscal policy, particularly for spending growth.  A larger seat majority held by the 
governing party is associated with a higher growth rate of government spending, higher fiscal 
deficits and greater variability in the growth rate of high-powered money (independent of party 
type).  However, while the degree of competition in the legislature appears to matter for these 
dimensions of policy, there is no evidence that the governing party has used either fiscal or 
monetary policy to stimulate the economy in the period leading into an election.  In this sense, 
the data do not support the hypothesis that government policy has been used opportunistically 
to support the re-election of the party in power. 
 While Table 5 treats each policy instrument as independent, the three fiscal policy 
instruments are necessarily interrelated through the government budget constraint and the two 
aspects of monetary policy could well be interrelated through unobservables.  For this reason, 
we re-run the three fiscal and two money instruments as separate sets of seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) and test for the presence of correlations arising among the equation residuals.  
The results are shown in Table 6. 
-- insert Table 6 about here – 
The Breusch-Pagan test for independence, shown in the bottom line of Table 6, rejects the 
independence of the fiscal instruments but does not allow rejection of the hypothesis that the 
two monetary dimensions are independent of each other.24 Hence the results in the first three 
 
23 It is interesting to note the difference in way the two world wars were financed.  That is, WW1 was financed 
largely by running government deficits with substantial increases in the national debt while WW2 featured a more 
balanced approach between tax increases and smaller sized deficits financed by borrowing (in part from the Bank 
of Canada). 
24 The correlation matrix of residuals in the fiscal system is                  gov_growth  tax_growth     gpolicy 
                                                                                                gov_growth      1.0000 
                                                                                                tax_growth       0.2416             1.0000 
                                                                                                gpolicy               0.3256              0.1078           1.0000 
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columns of Table 6 are preferred to the fiscal equations in the first three columns of Table 5, 
while the opposite holds true for the two monetary dimensions. 
 Correcting for the interactions among the policy instruments in the fiscal system makes 
the greatest difference for the deficit equation in column (3).  Accounting for the correlations 
arising among the equations’ residuals raises the explanatory power (R2) of the deficit equation 
from .071 to .555 and reveals as newly significant both the tendency under the Liberal Party for 
deficits to be lower and for deficits to be larger with greater trading openness.  Aside from 
these differences, the story told for the other aspects of fiscal policy in Table 5 is largely 
unchanged. The hypothesis that both government spending and deficits are countercyclical is 
even more strongly confirmed by the data as is the hypothesis that less political competition, as 
measured by a larger sized governing party majority, leads to larger government (greater 
spending and fiscal deficits) independent of partisan type and greater monetary uncertainty.  
Finally, there is again no evidence in the data consistent with government spending, taxation, 
deficits or monetary policy having been used opportunistically in the period leading into the 
upcoming election.    
One interpretation of the results in Tables 5 and 6 in combination with those of Table 3 
is that providing fiscal responsibility and ‘good government’ has been a winning political 
strategy for incumbent parties in Canadian federal elections.  Tables 1 and 2 show that higher 
average levels of economic performance over the life of a government results in a better 
outcome for the incumbent rather than simply having a higher growth rate at the time of an 
upcoming election.  This is consistent with the absence of evidence in Tables 3, 5 and 6 of policy 
being used in ways that would stimulate the economy in pre-election time periods and positive 
evidence of policy being used both countercyclically to stabilize the economy and to provide 
financial stability by preventing the accumulation of long run debt.  The finding from Table 6 
that longer-lived parties in government in general and the more successful of Canada’s 
governing parties (the Liberal Party) in particular are associated with smaller sized fiscal deficits 
suggests that voters are cognisant of the cost of larger deficits and rising debt.  Finally, the data 
are also consistent with the hypothesis that greater political competition, as represented in our 
data set by a smaller sized election victories and hence greater opposition oversight in the 
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legislature discourages government excess, producing both less spending and lower taxes 
without producing a significant rise in fiscal deficits.   
 
4. Conclusion 
What this analysis makes apparent is that in Canada economic circumstance and 
government policy have mattered both for the incumbent’s election outcome and for the stability 
of the political party structure without indicating the presence of either a political business or 
political budget cycle.  Rather the data is more consistent with the hypothesis that voters have 
held the political party in power responsible for the economic performance of the economy 
arising during its tenure without needing to provide an opportunistic boost in spending or 
favourable tax reduction in the period leading into an election.  This favourable response by the 
voting public to the provision of ‘good governance’ not only implies a concern with outcomes 
over the entire governing period but is consistent with a desire for policy to be used to moderate 
the effects of the business cycle. Hence evidence of countercyclical fiscal policy in the data helps 
to explain the inverse relationship found between per capita growth rates and measures of fiscal 
policy stimulus, a relationship that has sometimes been misinterpreted as implying that 
government size is too large.  
Of the three forms of volatility featured in our analysis, only the volatility of the inflation 
rate is found to be associated with election outcomes.  Here greater inflation uncertainty is 
associated poorer electoral outcomes, increasing party vote volatility and thus adding instability 
to the party structure.  As has been noted elsewhere, larger seat majorities held by the winning 
political party (independent of the partisan nature of the party in power) are associated with 
higher rates of spending and growing fiscal deficits. On the other hand, while the data is not 
inconsistent with the hypotheses suggested elsewhere that periods of minority and/or liberal 
government spend more, tax less and run deficits, neither hypothesis is confirmed by the data. 
Over the post-Confederation time period, not one of these sympathetically signed coefficient 
estimates is significantly different from zero. 
The unanswered question for Canada is whether the changed incentives favouring the 
strategic use of policy following the introduction of fixed governing terms will introduce policy 
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opportunism into Canadian federal politics.  At present even the fixity of fixed term elections is 
still under question.  Of the four elections held since the Conservative government introduced 
fixed terms in 2007, only two have been held at their legislated date, the other  two, involving 
minority governments, ended well before their legislated term.25  To the extent that fixed terms 
become fixed under majority governments, predetermined terms will allow the governing party 
to incorporate known implementation lags into the design and timing of policy and hence better 
gage when the effect of policy choices will be realized.   Whether such policy strategies will be 
adopted by the governing party or rendered mute by voters’ rational expectations (a la Brender 
and Drazen, 2008) remains at present an open question. 
 
 
25 The most recent election (2019) has also produced a minority government increasing the likelihood that another 
election will arise unexpected before its four-year term limit.  Because Canadian legislation does not include a 
minimum vote percentage requirement (such as the 2/3 provision in U.K. legislation), the Prime Minister retains 
the initiative in generating conditions for an election call under minority governments.  
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Table 1 
Does the Incumbent’s Election Outcome depend on Economic Performance? Canada 1870-2015 
(standard errors in brackets below) 
 
 
 
Incumbent 
winner 
(Logit) 
(1) 
Incumbent 
winner 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Vote share of 
the Incumbent 
party 
(3) 
Vote share of 
the Incumbent 
party 
(4) 
Incumbent 
winner 
(Logit) 
(5) 
Incumbent 
winner 
(Logit) 
(6) 
Vote share of 
the Incumbent 
party 
(7) 
Vote share of 
the incumbent 
party 
(8) 
Coverage 3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-- 42nd 
Elections 
3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th -- 42nd 
Elections 
3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-- 42nd 
Elections 
3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-42nd 
Elections 
Real per capita growth in the 
year before the election 
2.95 
(7.20) 
25.76* 
(13.24) 
0.0005 
(0.366) 
0.548 
(0.450) 
    
Prior average real per capita 
GDP growth rate 
    80.44*** 
(27.64) 
80.16** 
(32.46) 
1.250*** 
(0.460) 
2.195t 
(1.44) 
Prior CV_per capita growth 
rate 
0.045 
(0.064) 
0.055 
(0.248) 
0.0006 
(0.0007) 
-0.0013 
(0.0012) 
0.103 
(0.108) 
0.136* 
(0.076) 
0.0014* 
(0.0008) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
Prior average  
Inflation rate 
0.040 
(0.140) 
-0.078 
(0.199) 
0.0024 
(0.0044) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.144 
(0.160) 
-0.305 
(0.211) 
0.0004 
(0.0004) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
Prior CV_Inflation 
 Rate 
0.406 
(0.261) 
0.003 
(0.618) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.010 
(.011) 
0.508 
(0.388) 
0.469 
(0.565) 
-0.0006 
(0.003) 
0.021* 
(0.010) 
Prior average unemployment 
rateZ 
 -0.413 
(0.264) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
 
 
-0.092 
(0.154) 
 -0.008 
(0.006) 
Prior CV_urate  1.44 
(2.21) 
 0.076 
(0.73) 
 -3.078 
(3.447) 
 -0.046 
(0.094) 
 
Constant 
0.050 
(0.514) 
2.79 
(2.23) 
0.387*** 
(0.018) 
0.456*** 
(0.043) 
-1.157 
(0.846) 
0.605 
(2.10) 
0.370*** 
(0.016) 
0.412*** 
(0.068) 
Statistics: 
Obs. 
R2 
Durbin Watson 
Pseudo-R2 
 
39 
 
 
0.082 
 
27 
 
 
0.202 
 
39 
.038 
1.75 
 
 
27 
.356 
2.91 
 
39 
 
 
.275 
 
27 
 
 
.211 
 
39 
.079 
1.64 
 
27 
.419 
2.48 
Notes:  ***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1 (5) and [10] percent; t significantly different from zero at 14.3 percent. 
In earlier experimentation, current and prior per capita growth rates and multiple four-year windows were experimented with to allow for the incorporation of both present and past outcomes in 
forming expectations.  The current formulation using the prior year’s growth rate and the current and past three years for the averages and coefficients of variation best explained the data.    
Z   Unemployment data is available only from the 1921 election onward. Calculated as average unemployment rate over the previous governing period. 
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Table 2 
Does the Stability of Political Party Structure depend on Economic Performance? Canada, 1870-2015 by election 
(standard errors in brackets below) 
 
 
 
Constituency 
level Vote 
Volatility  
(1) 
Constituency 
level Vote 
Volatility 
(2) 
Vote Volatility 
at National 
Level 
(3) 
Vote Volatility 
at National 
Level 
(4) 
Constituency 
level Vote 
Volatility  
(5) 
Constituency 
level Vote 
Volatility  
(6) 
Vote Volatility 
at National 
Level 
(7) 
Vote Volatility 
at National 
Level 
(8) 
Coverage 3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-42nd 
Elections 
3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-42nd 
Elections 
3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-42nd 
Elections 
3rd – 42nd 
Elections 
15th-42nd 
Elections 
Per capita real growth in 
year prior to election 
-0.069 
(0.267) 
-0.224 
(0.275) 
0.008 
(0.249) 
-0.342 
(0.381) 
    
Average prior real per 
capita GDP growth 
    -1.575*** 
(0.458) 
-1.346 
(1.113) 
-1.671*** 
(0.541) 
-2.048 
(1.404) 
CV_real per capita 
growth rate 
0.0001 
(0.0004) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0008** 
(0.0003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
Average  
Inflation rate 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
0.001 
(0.005) 
0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
CV_Inflation 
 rate 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.017* 
(0.008) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.022* 
(0.013) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.012 
(0.013) 
Previous Unemployment 
RateZ 
 0.012*** 
(0.004) 
 0.012** 
(0.006) 
 0.008** 
(0.004) 
 0.007 
(0.005) 
CV_Unrate  0.055 
(0.068) 
 -0.010 
(0.086) 
 0.124 
(0.086) 
 0.094 
(0.119) 
 
Constant 
0.173*** 
(0.019) 
0.062 
(0.037) 
0.094*** 
(0.019) 
0.039 
(0.034) 
0.193*** 
(0.015) 
0.089* 
(0.049) 
0.117*** 
(0.019) 
0.081 
(0.063) 
Statistics: 
Obs. 
R2 
Durbin Watson 
 
38 
0.030 
1.97 
 
27 
.330 
2.57 
 
39 
0.021 
1.88 
 
27 
.250 
2.66 
 
39 
.305 
1.92 
 
27 
.374 
2.22 
 
39 
.251 
1.73 
 
27 
.324 
2.25 
***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1 (5) and [10] percent.  See also the notes from Table 1 
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Table 3 
Do Electoral Outcomes Respond to Fiscal Policy and Political Variables? Canada: 1870- 2015 by election 
(standard errors in brackets below) 
 
 
Incumbent 
Party winner 
(Logit) 
(1) 
Incumbent 
Party winner 
(Logit) 
(2) 
Incumbent 
Party Vote 
Share 
(3) 
Incumbent 
Party Vote 
Share 
(4) 
Constituency Vote 
Volatility using 
Super-constituencies 
(5) 
Constituency Vote 
Volatility using 
Super-constituencies 
(6) 
Party Vote 
Volatility at the 
National Level 
(7) 
Party Vote 
Volatility at the 
National Level 
(8) 
Coverage 1870-2015 1935-2015 1870-2015 1935-2015 1870-2015 1935-2015 1870-2015 1935-2015 
Average growth rate of 
government spending  
-4.26 
(4.38) 
-17.82** 
(8.13) 
0.100 
(0.200) 
-0.505*** 
(0.242) 
-0.040 
(0.102) 
-0.089 
(0.198) 
-0.176 
(0.150) 
-0.149 
(0.210) 
Coefficient of variation 
of government 
spending growth 
-0.038 
(0.034) 
-0.093** 
(0.038) 
0.0001 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.0003 
(0.0004) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
-0.0006 
(0.0008) 
-0.0001 
(0.001) 
Average growth rate of 
taxation  
5.41 
(9.51) 
70.83* 
(40.38) 
-0.317 
(0.345) 
0.678 
(0.877) 
0.245 
(0.185) 
1.205 
(0.787) 
0.428 
(0.308) 
0.821 
(0.913) 
Coefficient of variation 
of tax rate growth 
0.035 
(0.135) 
0.149 
(0.277) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.0003 
(0.003) 
-0.008 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
Average rate of Money 
growth 
 22.34 
(25.98) 
 0.111 
(0.613) 
 -0.711 
(0.450) 
 -0.603 
(0.618) 
Coefficient of Variation 
of money growth rate 
 0.292 
(0.622) 
 -0.007 
(0.016) 
 0.022 
(0.015) 
 0.030* 
(0.017) 
Voter turnout -0.033 
(0.064) 
-0.133 
(0.119) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
D(registration 
proportion) 
-0.132 
(0.085) 
-0.058 
(0.202) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.009)) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.0006 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
Length of previous 
governing term 
0.570 
(0.396) 
0.168 
(0.575) 
0.006 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.023) 
0.035*** 
(0.009) 
0.042** 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.012) 
0.027 
(0.022) 
Incumbent Liberal 
Government 
0.978 
(0.783) 
1.478 
(1.456) 
0.043 
(0.032) 
0.070 
(0.053) 
-0.034 
(0.021) 
-0.064 
(0.042) 
-0.029 
(0.033) 
-0.094 
(0.059) 
Previous Minority 
government 
2.58** 
(1.11) 
3.32* 
(1.79) 
0.016 
(0.030) 
0.060 
(0.045) 
0.027 
(0.056) 
0.005 
(0.048) 
0.026 
(0.029) 
-0.027 
(0.058) 
Constant 
 
0.062 
(4.85) 
11.73 
(11.75) 
0.126 
(0.175) 
0.216 
(0.165) 
0.154 
(0.166) 
0.132 
(0.179) 
0.144 
(0.205) 
0.293 
(0.206) 
Statistics: 
Obs. 
R2 
Durbin Watson 
Pseudo-R2 
 
39 
 
 
.112 
 
24 
 
 
.390 
 
39 
.169 
1.89 
 
24 
.350 
2.12 
 
39 
.470 
2.07 
 
24 
.622 
2.50 
 
39 
0.164 
1.74 
 
24 
.519 
2.62 
***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1 (5) and [10] percent.  Monetary policy becomes feasible only following the creation of the Bank of Canada in 1935.  
 
 
   
Table 4 
Variables determining Policy, Definitions and Time Series Characteristics 
 
 
 
Policy Responses to 
Variable Definition Augmented Dickey 
Fuller Statistics  
ADF(145, 1%) = - 3.495 
ADF(145, 5%) = -2.887 
the Business Cycle a. Real GDP per capita 
growth (PC_growth) 
b. Instrumented real 
GDP per capita growth 
 
 
Instrumented by USiip growth,  
PC_growth = - 10.09 
 
PC_growth = - 12.17 
(predicted) 
USiip_growth = -12.2 
Demographic and 
heterogeneity 
characteristics 
Urban/rural mix 
 
Immigration rate 
 
Percentage young 
 
Openness 
Change in proportion of 
labour force in agriculture 
Immigration as a proportion of 
the population 
Change in the proportion of 
the population below 16 
(Exports + Imports)/GDP 
D(Agric LF) = -9.357 
 
Immigration = -3.364 
 
D2(Pop_young) = -12.18 
 
D(Open) = -8.801 
Political 
characteristics of 
the government 
and/or election 
Minority government 
 
Partisanship 
 
Duration of party in 
government 
Voter turnout 
 
Change in the size of the 
franchise 
Dummy variable ( 1 if minority 
                                0 otherwise) 
Dummy variable (1 if liberal 
                        0 if conservative) 
Year in continuous party 
governance (across elections) 
Percentage of registered 
voters who vote 
Percentage of the population 
that is registered to vote 
 
 
 
 
Party_term = -4.395 
 
Voter Turnout = -3.15 
 
D(registered) = -11.98 
Special events 
WW1 
WW2 
War effects of WW1 
 
War effects of WW2 
Dummy variable (1 if year is 
between 1914 and 1917) 
Dummy variable (1 if year is 
between 1939 and 1945) 
 
Political 
competition in the 
legislature 
Incumbent seats Percentage of seats held by 
the governing party 
Seats = -4.853 
Opportunism Year leading into the 
upcoming election 
Dummy variable = (1 in year 
prior to election; 0 otherwise) 
 
Policy Instruments 
 
Growth rate of government 
expenditures (G/Y) 
Growth rate of government 
revenues (T/Y) 
Log Deficit 
Growth rate of the Deficit 
Growth rate of the Money 
Base (MB) 
CV of the money growth rate 
Ln(G/Y) – Ln(G/Y)(-1) 
 
Ln(T/Y) – Ln(T/Y)(-1) 
 
Ln(G/Y) – Ln(T/Y) 
D(Ln(G/Y) – Ln(T/Y)) 
Ln(MB) – Ln(MB)(-1) 
 
CV of MB_growth (4 year) 
Gov_growth = -7.091 
 
Tax_growth = -7.689 
 
Deficit = -3.356 
D(Deficit) = -7.823 
MB_growth = -4.238 
 
CV_mb_growth = -4.361 
Table 5 
Two Stage Least Squares Regressions relating Policy Choices to Political Variables: Canada, 1870 - 2015 
(robust standard errors in brackets below coefficient estimates) 
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 Growth Rate of 
Government 
Spending (G/Y) as 
a fraction of GDP 
(1) 
Growth Rate of 
Government 
Revenues (T/Y) as 
a fraction of GDP 
(2) 
Growth rate of 
Government Deficit 
measured as  
D(ln(G/Y) -ln(T/Y)) 
(3) 
Growth Rate 
of the Money 
Base 
 
(4) 
Coefficient of 
Variation of 
Monetary Base 
Growth 
(5) 
Coverage 1870 - 2015 1870 - 2015 1870 - 2015 1936 - 2015 1936 - 2015 
Per capita GDP growth 
rate (instrumented) 
-1.305* 
(0.679) 
-0.186 
(0.332) 
-1.119 
(0.775) 
-0.112 
(0.773) 
-3.093 
(7.395) 
D(Agriculture’s share of 
the Labour Force) 
-4.848 
(3.129) 
-1.309 
(1.403) 
-3.539 
(2.929) 
-2.017 
(2.327) 
-8.242 
(22.19) 
Immigration rate 
 
1.368 
(0.858) 
0.162 
(0.568) 
1.207 
(0.993) 
-1.536 
(3.105) 
-61.64 
(54.64) 
D2(Percentage of the 
population below 16) 
-0.287* 
(0.161) 
-0.073 
(0.077) 
-0.214* 
(0.123) 
-0.046 
(0.092) 
1.720 
(1.077) 
D(Openness) 
 
0.007 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
0.028 
(0.032) 
Minority government 0.037 
(0.036) 
-0.017 
(0.017) 
0.054 
(0.033) 
-0.005 
(0.014) 
0.532* 
(0.282) 
Liberal Government 
 
0.037 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.009) 
0.041 
(0.027) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
-0.062 
(0.167) 
Duration of Party Tenure 
across elections 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.002** 
(0.0009) 
-0.003 
(0.002) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
Voter Turnout 
 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.0004 
(0.001) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
D(Size of the voting 
franchise) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.025 
(0.041) 
Percentage of seats won 
by the winning  party 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.0002 
(0.0006) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
WW1 
 
0.117** 
(0.052) 
0.018 
(0.034) 
0.099 
(0.064) 
  
 
WW2 
 
0.190** 
(0.093) 
0.121*** 
(0.039) 
0.069 
(0.079) 
0.100*** 
(0.029) 
-0.862* 
(0.437) 
Year leading into an 
election 
0.0002 
(0.026) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.014 
(0.027) 
0.00002 
(0.010) 
0.070 
(0.221) 
Log(Government Deficit)    0.091** 
(0.039) 
-1.02** 
(0.437) 
Constant 
 
0.307** 
(0.146) 
-0.030 
(0.066) 
0.338** 
(0.144) 
0.079 
(0.093) 
0.050 
(1.05) 
Statistics 
Observations 
Centered R2 
Uncentered R2 
Underidentification  
Chi-square (P value) 
Overidentification Test 
Hansen J Statistic 
 
144 
.215 
.218 
 
13.26    (0.000) 
 
0.000 
 
144 
.303 
.312 
 
13.26     (0.000) 
 
0.000 
 
144 
.071 
.071 
 
13.26   (0.000) 
 
0.000 
 
80t 
0.626 
0.836 
 
5.30   (0.02) 
 
0.000 
 
78t 
.327 
.704 
 
5.90   (0.015) 
 
0.000 
***(**)[*] significantly different from zero at 1 (5) and [10] percent. t Monetary policy becomes feasible only after the creation of the 
Bank of Canada in 1932.  D(), D2() refer to the use of the first and second differences of the variable in brackets. 
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Table 6 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions for Fiscal Policy and Monetary Policy: Canada, 1870 - 2015 
(standard errors in brackets below coefficient estimates) 
  Fiscal Instruments  Monetary Instruments 
 Growth Rate of 
Government 
Spending (G/Y) as 
a fraction of GDP 
(1) 
Growth Rate of 
Government 
Revenues (T/Y) as 
a fraction of GDP 
(2) 
Growth rate of 
Government Deficit 
measured as  
D(ln(G/Y) -ln(T/Y)) 
(3) 
Growth Rate 
of the Money 
Base 
 
(4) 
Coefficient of 
Variation of 
Monetary Base 
Growth 
(5) 
Coverage 1870 - 2015 1870 - 2015 1870 - 2015 1936 - 2015 1936 - 2015 
Per capita GDP growth 
(predicted) 
-0.953** 
(0.448) 
-0.136 
(0.202) 
-0.874Z 
(0.594) 
-0.035 
(0.299) 
-1.392 
(4.968) 
D(Agriculture’s share 
of the Labour Force) 
-2.668 
(1.808) 
-0.999 
(0.816) 
-3.979 
(2.397) 
-1.566* 
(0.927) 
-2.227 
(15.39) 
Immigration rate 
 
0.981 
(1.215) 
0.106 
(0.549) 
-2.116 
(1.611) 
0.144 
(2.258) 
-52.20 
(37.49) 
D2(Percentage of the 
population below 16) 
-0.236* 
(0.127) 
-0.066 
(0.057) 
0.059 
(0.169) 
-0.044 
(0.047) 
1.940** 
(0.795) 
D(Openness) 
 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.003Z 
(0.002) 
0.015** 
(0.005) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.023 
(0.031) 
Minority government 0.029 
(0.041) 
-0.018 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.054) 
-0.009 
(0.016) 
0.511* 
(0.271) 
Liberal Government 
 
0.022 
(0.024) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.070** 
(0.031) 
0.001 
(0.012) 
-0.093 
(0.200) 
Duration of Party 
Tenure across elections 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.005 
(0.003) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.007 
(0.019) 
Voter Turnout 
 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.0003 
(0.001) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
0.0002 
(0.001) 
-0.020 
(0.015) 
D(Size of the voting 
franchise) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
0.006*** 
(0.003) 
-0.029 
(0.042) 
Percentage of seats 
held by Incumbent  
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.0013* 
(0.0008) 
0.004Z 
(0.002) 
-0.0005 
(0.0006) 
0.046*** 
(0.011) 
WW1 
 
0.142** 
(0.056) 
0.021 
(0.025) 
0.595*** 
(0.074) 
  
 
WW2 
 
0.167*** 
(0.054) 
0.118*** 
(0.025) 
0.452*** 
(0.072) 
0.113*** 
(0.024) 
-0.844** 
(0.401) 
Year leading into an 
election 
-0.011 
(0.025) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.032 
(0.033) 
0.0004 
(0.010) 
0.083 
(0.167) 
Log(Government 
Deficit) 
   0.098*** 
(0.030) 
-1.018** 
(0.493) 
Constant 
 
0.243Z 
(0.166) 
-0.040 
(0.075) 
0.689** 
(0.219) 
0.068 
(0.065) 
0.155 
(1.082) 
Statistics 
Observations 
R2  
Breusch-Pagan test of 
independence 
 
144 
.233 
 
Chi2(3) = 25.34 
 
144 
.278 
 
Prob= 0.00 
 
144 
.555 
 
78t 
0.644 
 
Chi2(2) = .324 
 
78t 
.343 
 
Prob= .569 
***(**)[*]{Z) significantly different from zero at 1, (5), (10) and {15} percent. t Monetary policy becomes feasible only after the creation 
of the Bank of Canada in 1932.  D(), D2() refer to the use of the first and second differences of the variable in brackets. 
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Data Appendix 
 
The economic data come from several sources: Urquhart (1993) and Leacy et al. (1983) for the economic 
variables in the earliest time period (1870 through 1921); Cansim I and II, the statistical databases maintained 
by Statistics Canada, for these variables in the later time period (1921-2015); and the political data from Beck 
(1968) and the official web site of Parliament www.parl.gc.ca for election data.  More precise definitions and 
their sources are given below. 
1.   Economic variables and data sources: D(.) = first different operator; LN(.)= logarithm indicator. 
GDP = gross domestic product in current dollars. 1870-1926: Urquhart (1993: 24-25) (in millions); 1927-1938: 
Leacy et al. (1983: 130); 1939–1960 Canadian Economic Observer (Table 1.4), CANSIM D11073 = GNP at market 
prices. 1961-2001 CANSIM I D16466 = CANSIM II V499724 (aggregated from quarterly data).  Note GNP data is 
not available before 1870 so that GNP numbers were calculated by assuming that the tax size of government 
remained constant between 1867 and 1869.  Since data is available on federal government tax revenue, a value 
for GNP was implied.   
P = GNP deflator before 1927 and GDP deflator after (1986 = 100). 1870-1926: Urquhart, (1993), 24-25; 1927-
1995 (1986=100): Cansim data label D14476; 1981-2015, Cansim II V62470999 
N = Population size. 1870- 1926, M.C. Urquhart (1993), Gross National Product, Canada, pp.24-5;1927-1955, 
CANSIM D31248; 1996-2015, CANSIM Table 051-0005: Cansim D1. 
RGDPPC = GDP/PN;  PC_growth = LnRGPPC – LnRGDPPC(-1) 
G = total federal government expenditure net of interest payments.1870-1989: Gillespie (1991: 284-286); 1990-
1996: Public Accounts of Canada 1996-97: 1997-2000: Federal Government Public Accounts, Table 3 Budgetary 
Revenues Department of Finance web site, September 2001. To this we add the return on government 
investment (ROI) originally subtracted by Gillespie for his own purposes.  Expenditure is net of interest paid to 
the private sector. Data on ROI: 1870 to 1915:  Public Accounts (1917: 64); 1915-1967: Dominion Government 
Revenue and Expenditure: Details of Adjustments 1915-1967 Table W-1; 1916-17 to 1966-67: Securing 
Economic Renewal - The Fiscal Plan, Feb 10, 1988, Table XI; 1987-88 to 1996-97: Public Accounts 1996, Table 
2.2. Interest on the Debt (ID) was subtracted out (with adjustment for interest paid to the Bank of Canada (BCI) 
ultimately returned to the government). Data on ID: 1870-1926: Leacy et al. (1983: Series H19-34): Federal 
Government budgetary expenditures, classified by function, 1867-1975; 1926-1995: Cansim D11166. 1996-
2000: Cansim D18445. Finally, data for BCI: copied by hand from the Annual Reports of The Bank of Canada, 
Statement of Income and Expense, Annually, 1935-2000. Net Income paid to the Receiver General (for the 
Consolidated Revenue Acct).  Note: all government data are converted from fiscal to calendar years, and allows 
for a change in the definition of the fiscal year in 1906/07, as described in Gillespie (1991: Appendix C). 
GSIZE = non-interest federal government, direct public expenditure, calculated as: G/GDP. 
MB = Money Base.  Metcalfe, Redish and Shearer, New Estimates of the Canadian Money Stock 1871-1967; 
1967-2015, Cansim B1646 (annual average of monthly data).  GROWTHMB = LnMB – LnMB(-1) 
T = Government revenues 1868-1989: W. Irwin Gillespie, Tax, Borrow and Spend: Financing Federal Spending in 
Canada, 1867 - 1990, Carleton University Press, 1991, pp.284-286; 1996-97, Public Accounts of Canada; 1997-
2015: Federal Government Public Accounts, Table 3 Budgetary Revenues Department of Finance web site, 
September 2001.  TSIZE = T/GDP  
LNDEFICIT= lnGsize – LnTsize (used because the difference, GSIZE – TSIZE is often negative). 
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IMRATIO = immigration/POP. Immigration: 1870 1953 O.J. Firestone Canadas Economic Development 1867–
1953 Table 83, Population, Families, Births, Deaths (in thousands); 1954–1995; Cansim D27; 1996–2015 Cansim 
II v16.  
YOUNG = percentage of the population 16/17 and younger; 1870–1920, Lacey et al. (1983) interpolated from 
census figures Table A28-45 sum of columns 29, 30, 31, and 32, all divided by 28; 1921–1970 Cansim C892547; 
1971–2015 Cansim II v466965. 
EXPORTS and IMPORTS = 1929-1960, Leacy (1983), Series G383, 384; 1960-1995, CANSIM series D14833 & 
D14836; 1996-2014, CANSIM II v647592.  Openness = EXPORTS and IMPORTS/GDP 
USiip = Index of Industrial Production for the United States. 1870-1929: Table A15. NBER, Nutter; 1930-1970,  
Table A16. (BEA) Bureau of Economic Analysis;1971-1995: Cansim D360048 (1987=100);1996-2015, U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Business Cycle Indicators, Index of Industrial Production 1992=100. USiip_growth = 
LnUSiip – LnUSiip(-1). 
Unemployment rate: 1919-2016; Annual average of monthly figures, both sexes 15 years and older, Cansim II 
Series No. V2062815. 
 
2.   Political variables and data sources:   
 
We note that SEATS data differs from the official parliamentary web site for the period before 1945. We have 
followed Beck (1968) who makes sensible decisions about which small parties support the government and 
hence which should be counted as part of it.  On this basis:  
 
GOVERNING TERM = number of years since the current parliament started. 
 
DURATION OF PARTY TENURE = number of years since the party was first elected. 
  
ELAPSE = the number of years since the last election.  
 
ELYEAR = 1 if an election year; = 0 otherwise; ELYEAR(1)= ELYEAR forwarded one year.   
 
INCUMBENT = 1 if the party winning the current election was the previous governing party; = 0 otherwise. 
 
LIBERAL = 1 if governing party was the Liberal Party; = 0 if any other (more conservative) party. 
 
MINORITY = 1 if the governing party was part of a minority government; = 0 otherwise. 
 
VOTONG FRANCHISE = (number of electors on voter lists/Population) 
 
VOTER TURNOUT = (number of voters/registered) 
 
SEATS = percentage of the seats won (or effectively controlled) by the governing party. 
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